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CASENOTE
The Military Activities Case: New
Perspectives on the International Court
of Justice and Global Public Ordert
The International Court of Justice in the case of Military and
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America)t resolved in Nicaragua's favor its claim that the
United States was engaged in unlawful uses of military force in
Nicaragua. Military activities included the mining of Nicaraguan ports,
attacks on ports and facilities, and support of rebellious forces called
the contras.
The issues raised in the case are whether the United States had
engaged in aggression, whether the Court has the statutory authority
and competence to adjudicate claims relating to aggression and on-
going hostilities, and whether these are issues that should have been
assessed and decided by other processes, pursuant to practice among
states in the global community under the United Nations Charter.
The background to the case can be briefly sketched, but those who
are concerned with the details and the conflicting and differing ap-
praisals of the facts must go to other sources, including the opinion
and dissents of the Court itself.2
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versity, National Security Studies Program. New York Bar; Supreme Court Bar; Barrister
at Law, of Gray's Inn, London.
t This paper has a different viewpoint and stresses different arguments from the article
by James P. Rowles entitled "Nicaragua v. United States: Issues of Law and Policy," which
appeared in Volume 20, No. 4 of The International Lawyer. All of the observations set forth
in this paper are the author's and should not be attributed to others. A subsequent paper
on a related subject will be published in the California Western International Law Journal.
1. 1986 I.C.J. 14 [hereinafter Military Activities Case].
2. The background and facts for this case were taken from the statements of the Court
and the dissenting judges, and also from Moore, The Secret War in Central America and
the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (1986).
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!. Background
The dispute in the Military Activities Case relates to events that arose
subsequent to the fall of the government of President Anastasio Somoza
Debayle in July 1979. A Junta of National Reconstruction and an eighteen-
member government were installed by the group that overthrew President
Somoza, the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN). This
group initially enjoyed wide support of all segments of Nicaraguan society.
Moreover, in a Resolution adopted by the Organization of American States
(OAS) on June 23, 1979, the insurgency against a government in place
was recognized, affording legitimacy to the insurgents. Numerous coun-
tries in Latin America actively supported the insurgents. None supported
Somoza. The United States terminated its military assistance to Somoza
two years before he was overthrown, and prevailed upon Israel and Gua-
temala to curtail their support. It then called the OAS meeting that led
to Somoza's fall.
OAS support was conditioned upon the insurgents' support and pro-
motion of a democratic, pluralist, and nonaligned Nicaragua. The FSLN
accepted these conditions by cable to the OAS dated July 12, 1979. Never-
theless, the FSLN then ignored the conditions, largely, according to Pro-
fessor John Norton Moore, because the revolution was captured by Cas-
tro and the Cubans. Judge Schwebel in his detailed dissent raises facts
and evidence-ignored by the majority opinion-that clearly indicate that
those in control in the FSLN quickly adopted arbitrary measures, in-
cluding violence, to keep the Nicaraguan people in order. The FSLN also
formed the Sandinista General Directorate of State Security, a major
component of government modeled on the police organizations of the
communist countries, and the FSLN provided the assistance of approx-
imately 400 Cuban and 70 Soviet intelligence advisors and a number of
East Germans and Bulgarians.
As the FSLN gained control over Nicaragua, internal opposition
mounted. Two Nicaraguan ambassadors to the United States defected.
Large numbers joined the opposition, turning finally to armed force to
regain the social order they had fought to establish in the revolt against
Somoza. The opposition group identified as the contras had more than
11,000 active members by the end of 1985.
Once the United States recognized that the FSLN would not meet the
conditions for civil and human rights required under the FSLN's agree-
ment with the OAS, the United States suspended in January 1981, and
terminated in April 1981, the substantial economic aid it had been pro-
viding. Evidence then appeared that Nicaragua was supporting guerrillas
and seeking to overthrow the government in El Salvador. While the United
States did not interrupt diplomatic relations, it began to support the con-
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tras and later pursued armed activities, including the mining of the ports
in early 1984 and overflights of Nicaraguan territory.
Attempts to terminate the hostilities in the region began in January
1983, initiated by the meetings of Colombia, Panama, Mexico, and Ven-
ezuela at Contadora, Panama, and referred to as the Contadora talks.
These talks, supported by the OAS, produced an agreement on a twenty-
one-point Document of Objectives calling for active and verifiable imple-
mentation by Nicaragua of democratic measures. If implemented, these
points would have met United States concerns.
Nevertheless, the Contadora Process faltered. New documents were
substituted for the Document of Objectives, modifying and changing it.
Attempts to have the OAS intervene in the situation were rebuffed by
Nicaragua. The United Nations Security Council and General Assembly
deferred to the Contadora process. Third-party efforts by the United
States to reach a peaceful solution through negotiations were rejected by
Nicaragua.
Professor Moore3 has traced a worldwide disinformation campaign waged
by the Nicaraguan Government which sought to convince citizens in the
democratic countries that Nicaragua, which was already the most heavily
armed Central American nation except for Cuba, was arming itself ex-
clusively for self-defense, and was engaged in massive human rights ef-
forts. This campaign concealed the rising claim of Communists within the
Nicaraguan ruling groups to control of the government. Law firms and
public relations firms in the United States were hired and instructed to
lobby Congress and to provide public information supporting the Nicar-
aguan case against the contras and against the positions assumed by the
United States Government.
A. PROVISIONAL MEASURES
The Military Activities Case was filed in the International Court of
Justice. Only forty-six states are subject to its jurisdiction, many of
these with reservations conditioning that jurisdiction. It is notable that
no communist states have consented to the Court's jurisdiction. On
April 9, 1984, Nicaragua filed an application with the Court to com-
mence proceedings against the United States concerning the alleged
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. 4 On May
10, 1984, the Court issued provisional measures providing that the
3. See supra note 2.
4. 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 135 (1985); see also Moore, supra note 2, at 92. For recent
comments on the Military Activities Case, see 148 WORLD AFFAIRS 3-69 (1985) (various
articles compiled under the heading Nicaragua v. The United States Before the International
Court of Justice).
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United States should cease restriction of access to Nicaraguan ports,
refrain from the laying of mines in Nicaraguan waters, cease activities
infringing the sovereignty and independence of Nicaragua through the
use of force, and join with Nicaragua in ensuring that no action would
be taken to prejudice the rights of the other side in carrying out the
decisions of the Court. 5
In its determinations regarding jurisdiction, the Court declared in its
Judgment dated November 26, 1984,6 that it had jurisdiction under
customary international law and pursuant to articles 36(2) and 36(5) of
the Statute of the Court 7 both with respect to the parties and the
subject-matter of the case. Further, the Court held that it had juris-
diction under the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty of
January 21, 1956.8 In a letter dated January 18, 1985, the United States
withdrew from the Court, observing that the Court did not have ju-
risdiction and that its Judgment "was clearly and manifestly erroneous
as to both fact and law." 9
The Court reached its decision on the merits on June 27, 1986, declaring
that the United States, though absent from the proceedings on the merits,
had violated customary international law with respect to aggression against
Nicaragua and had also violated the "object and purpose" of the Treaty
of Friendship.
In reaching its decision on the merits, the Court relied upon submissions
of Nicaragua, upon data and information from public sources, including
the news media, upon public documents of the United States Government
(but ignoring many documents of the Nicaraguan Government), and upon
testimony by witnesses called by Nicaragua. Judge Schwebel, in a long
dissent, rejected the Court's findings against the United States, except
for a violation that he found inherent in the failure of the United States
to notify mariners about the blockade of Nicaragua. Dissents were also
filed by Judges Oda and Jennings.
5. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Request
for Provisional Measures, 1984 I.C.J. 169, paras. 41(B)(1) and 41(B)(2) (Order of May 11),
reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 468, 477 (1984).
6. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), .'uris-
diction and Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26), reprinted in 24 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 59 (1985). For an analysis of the judgment, see Moore, supra note 2, at 93.
7. U.N. CHARTER, STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE [hereinafter
Statute of the Court]. Pursuant to article 96 of the Charter, all members of the United
Nations are parties to the Statute of the Court. Id. art. 96.
8. 1984 I.C.J.Y.B. 144: see also Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and
Protocol, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, 367 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Treaty of Friendship]. The Treaty, signed at Managua on January 21, 1956, entered into
force May 24, 1958.
9. See 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 148; Moore, supra note 2, at 93.
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II. Holdings
With respect to the material issues, the Court held (in sixteen findings):
The actions and activities of the United States' applying force were not
justifiable under self-defense (and hence amounted to aggression); the actions
in support of the contra forces constituted a breach of customary international
law relating to obligations not to intervene; the mining of Nicaraguan waters
and overflights of Nicaragua were also breaches of that law; and the embargoes
with respect to trade, as well as the forcible actions just mentioned, were all
in breach of the Treaty of 1956.
The dissemination of a CIA manual on guerrilla warfare was contrary to the
"general principles of humanitarian law," but dissemination was not imputable
to the United States.
The United States was to terminate its violations of law; was to make re-
paration to Nicaragua for the breaches of law and of the Treaty of 1956; and
the Court reserved the right to establish the appropriate procedures if the parties
failed to reach agreement with respect to the "form and amount" of the re-
paration. And the parties were to seek a solution to their dispute "by peaceful
means in accordance with international law."
III. Issues and Assumptions
A. FACTUAL ISSUES
The most difficult issue in the Military Activities Case relates to the
facts. As Judge Schwebel indicates in a detailed analysis, the issue is (a)
whether the Court had fact-finding facilities and procedures adequate to
obtain operative facts necessary to render its decision pursuant to the
Statute of the Court, and (b) whether the Court actually invoked such
fact-finding procedures and whether, invoking them, it had acquired the
relevant facts.
Judge Schwebel concluded in his analysis that the Court had relied
instead upon assumptions and premises not supported by the facts them-
selves, and that had the Court marshalled the relevant facts for its de-
cision, it would have found, as he did, that Nicaragua was the aggressor;
that the United States' claim of self-defense was well founded; and that
self-defense constituted a complete defense to all of Nicaragua's claims.
In short, Nicaragua had come into Court with unclean hands.
Judge Schwebel observed:
[The Court] has excluded, discounted and excused the unanswerable evidence
of Nicaragua's major and maintained intervention in the Salvadoran insurgency,
an intervention which has consisted not only in provision of great quantities of
small arms until early 1981, but provision of arms, ammunition, munitions and
supplies thereafter and provision of command-and-control centers, training and
communications facilities and other support before and after 1981. The facts,
and the law, demanded condemnation of these Nicaraguan actions which, even
if not tantamount to armed attack, must constitute unlawful intervention. For
reasons that neither judicial nor judicious considerations sustain, the Court has
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chosen to depreciate these facts, to omit any consequential statement of the
law, and even, in effect, to appear to lend its good name to Nicaragua's mis-
representation of the facts. The Court may thereby have thrown into question
the validity of a Judgment which is bound to its factual predicates. By so doing,
Nicaragua's credibility has not been established, but that of the Court has been
strained. Moreover, the Court has in my view further compromised its Judgment
by its inference that there may be a double standard in the law governing the
use of force in international relations: intervention is debarred, except, it ap-
pears, in "the process of decolonization."'
0
Judge Schwebel raises here the "admissibility" of facts in terms of the
responsibility of the Court to have all of the relevant facts before it.
Nevertheless, his concern extends to the question whether the Court is
developing or formulating sound standards of relevance for receiving and
dealing with the facts, and selecting among them. The issue raised is
similar to that of ultra vires, i.e., whether an international court is acting
beyond its competence if it fails to receive and admit all the facts that
are available, particularly when they are available even in the absence of
one of the parties. Notwithstanding the similarities between procedures
and processes of the International Court and the procedures and processes
of domestic state courts, the International Court is under a much stricter
standard of judicial notice and judicial action, both as to the facts that it
must assess and the standards for weighing these facts, than are the
domestic courts.
Nevertheless, the International Court suffers from the lack of fact-
finding processes available for its use. Even though here it could have
reached the larger array of relevant facts, it fell back upon its own infer-
ences, assumptions, and presuppositions, leaving us with only broadly
stated principles, unlinked to the relevant facts. Article 53(2) of the Statute
of the Court requires the Court to "satisfy itself" that the claims it
receives are "well founded in fact and law."" As Judge Schwebel sug-
gests, however, the integrity of the Court requires that it satisfy the ex-
pectations among the global community as to its findings in fact and law,
and this places firm demands upon the judicious use of restraint.
B. LEGAL ISSUES
Other factual issues in this case might be more readily assimilated to
the analysis relating to the legal issues. The issues selected for assessment
are: (I) whether the use of force in ongoing hostilities is justiciable by the
Court, and whether the Court in seeking to resolve this issue is resolving
a "legal dispute" pursuant to its mandate under article 36(2) of the Statute
10. Supra note 1, para. 16 of dissent.
11. Statute of the Court, supra note 7, art. 53(2).
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of the Court; 12 and, (2) whether the Court is the proper organ to address
and regulate such issues, or for determining when and under what con-
ditions the use of force among states during ongoing hostilities is
impermissible.
The Court provides confusing assessment about the events occurring
in Nicaragua because it does not make clear distinctions between the law
and facts relating to aggression, and the law relating to hostilities. Aggres-
sion is regulated under article 2(4) of the Charter which is intended to
deter the impermissible use of force. 13 It raises the policy issue whether
a state is acting legitimately when it resorts to force for self-defense or
for other reasons. Hostilities are regulated under the law of war. Once
hostilities have commenced, regulation is based upon the principle of
military necessity that does not reject the violence but only serves to
moderate excess in the use of violence. The Court's failure here lies
primarily in its failure to admit the relevant facts about aggression.
The two issues that encompass much of the opinion by both the Court
and the dissenting judges are those of jurisdiction and the "legal dispute"
or justiciability. 14
C. JURISDICTION
A major difference between the opinions of the Court and the opinions
of the dissenting judges concerned the personal and subject matter juris-
diction of the Court. The difference occurs in the determination of when
and whether a state consents to the jurisdiction of the Court. Under
international practice a state's consent may be made through a general
instrument consenting to all cases, subject to conditions that the state
may wish to include in its reservations against consent. Alternatively,
jurisdiction may be authorized on a case-by-case basis.
Consent is established pursuant to the "optional clause" of the Statute
of the Court. It reads, in part, as follows:
Art. 36. 1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.
2. The state's parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation
to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court
12. Id. art. 36(2).
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
14. Issues of jurisdiction and justiciability in United States practice are reviewed in such
cases as Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
Brown v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953), and in the standard textbooks and casebooks
on the federal courts and constitutional law.
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in all legal disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question
of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of
the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 15
The United States had conditioned its consent to jurisdiction, deposited
on August 14, 1946,16 on the reservation that it would accept such juris-
diction as to disputes under a multilateral treaty only if all parties to the
treaty "affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the
Court."1 7 The Court, primarily addressing the United States' withdrawal
from the Court, decided that it did not have jurisdiction under the United
Nations Charter, but that it did have jurisdiction under customary inter-
national law relating to aggression in Nicaragua and the Treaty of Friend-
ship. 18 Judge Schwebel, in dissent on this issue, argued that the case was
not justiciable, or at least that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the
subject-matter in the case, because Nicaragua-the true aggressor as es-
tablished by the facts-had come into court with unclean hands.
Judge Schwebel also disagreed with the Court over the application
of the Treaty of Friendship. The provision most pertinent to jurisdic-
tion-article XXI-reads in part: "1. The present Treaty shall not
preclude the application of measures: ... (d) necessary to fulfill the
obligations of a Party for the maintenance or restoration of international
peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security inter-
ests."19
The Court held that the measures contemplated under this provision
could be implemented by the United States only if the measures taken
were "essential" for its security interests. The Court insisted that it could
make this determination, and then concluded largely without factual sup-
port or analysis that the mining of ports, military attacks on facilities,
and the embargoes imposed on Nicaraguan trade were not "necessary."
Schwebel found that the United States' measures were reasonable and
were based upon obligations under the Rio Treaty20 enabling the United
States to treat an attack on El Salvador as an attack upon the United
States. Judge Schwebel noted: "Moreover, the United States has con-
tended that its measures are necessary to protect its essential security
interests, a contention which cannot be dismissed in view of the increasing
15. Statute of the Court, supra note 7, art. 36.
16. See 1984-1985 I.C.J.Y.B. 143-44.
17. Id. at 144.
18. Treaty of Friendship, supra note 8.
19. Id. art. 21(I)(d).
20. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S.
No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio Treaty]. The Rio Treaty entered into force
December 3, 1948.
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integration of Nicaragua into the group of States led by the Soviet Union,
and Nicaragua's continuing subversion of its neighbors." 2 1
Judge Schwebel's observations raise the larger question of "who de-
cides" under a treaty negotiated and concluded among states with respect
to security interests. More deeply, the question concerns the matter of
policies relating to shaping and acting under global order: whether deci-
sions of this kind are for a tribunal faced with ongoing hostilities among
states or to be worked out in other fora or through other processes of
claim and counterclaim among states. This is the question of the "political
dispute" and justiciability considered in the next section.
D. LEGAL DISPUTES-JusTICIABILITY
Article 36(2)-the "optional clause" relating to consent to jurisdiction 22
introduces both jurisdiction over the subject matter and justiciability in
identifying the Court's competence as extending over "legal disputes."
The notion of the legal dispute has received attention in numerous cases
(cited in the opinion and dissenting opinions), but full clarification has not
been completed and requires a continued case-by-case approach. The
question of a "legal dispute" in international practice is closely connected
with the justiciability of a controversy.
Justiciability in international practice tends to differ from the notion in
domestic cases. According to Charles De Visscher, "justiciableness de-
pends on an objective criterion: it is the fitness of a dispute for settlement
on the basis of legal principles." 23 Hence it raises the question of judicial
discretion and judicial restraint. In international practice it also raises a
question for the statesman, who must determine whether to consent to
the Court's jurisdiction even assuming that there are legal rules, binding
on the Court at least, to afford judicial management of the controversy.
De Visscher refers to the difficulties of classifying the political notion
in view of its "fluid and capricious character," and because it relates to
"realities as yet uncontrolled not only by law but even by reason." 24
Hence, he stresses the functional side of the Court-whether it can man-
21. Supra note I, para. 254 of dissent.
22. Statute of the Court, supra note 7, art. 36(2).
23. C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 75, 331-
32 (P. Corbett trans. 1957). De Visscher notes that before the First World War:
[linternational-law doctrine, close enough on this point to international realities, was
agreed in regarding disputes of major importance as not arbitrable or justiciable. The
authors who had gone most deeply into the difficulty found precise expression for their
thought in the observation that this class must include all those disputes whose settlement
"might seriously affect the future possibilities of state power."
Id. at 75 (footnote omitted).
24. Id. at 77.
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age the controversy between two contesting states, particularly, as here,
where hostilities are continuing, and whether the "finality" of a court's
decision is relevant, in the decisional sense, to the actions pursued by
such states. De Visscher observes:
International practice demonstrates the reluctance of governments to submit to
compulsory decision conflicts of high political significance, not because it would
be impossible for the judge to decide them, but because his decision would not
satisfy the grievances out of which such conflicts spring. They hold a conflict
to be politically nonjusticiable when they know that satisfaction of their claims
can be found only in a change in the legal position protected by the law in force.
"A declaration of their legal rights when States are quarrelling about something
other than their rights is not in any true sense a 'settlement' of their dispute."
In such conflicts the judgment may well reject the claim and close the case; it
cannot liquidate the political tension between the parties. 25
These political realities are particularly evident in the Military Activities
Case, but there are the further realities of the United Nations Charter
and the processes relating to decisions to be made through the United
Nations to consider. The Court is the "principal judicial organ" of the
United Nations and therefore is expected to promote the objects and
purposes of the Charter, that is, relieve the tensions among states that
might affect the maintenance of international peace and security. As Judge
Schwebel points out, this task would include clear-sighted recognition of
state actions like those of the United States aimed at its own defense.
While the United Nations is not a governmental body, it contains the
functional element of the "separation of powers," so that that element
and the notion of the "political dispute" from the practice of the United
States Supreme Court can be usefully invoked for a clearer appreciation
of the expectations among states. These expectations regarding global
order and its institutions do not differ in the larger sense from those that
have developed in municipal systems.
Unlike the domestic practice, the orders of the International Court are
not enforceable. Under article 94(2) of the Charter 26 a party seeking relief
in terms of effective measures based upon a judgment in his favor must
make a request for relief of the Security Council. The Security Council
at its discretion can make recommendations or decide upon the appro-
priate measures. For this reason the finality of the Court's opinion and
judicial management are immediately raised to the surface of any action
or measure pursued by the Court.
States resort to military measures when they perceive a need to protect
their own interests or their allies. The issue in the Military Activities Case
25. Id. at 331-32 (footnote omitted).
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 94(2).
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involves this strategic concern, and the legal issue of whether the United
States is involved in unlawful acts amounting to aggression or whether
its acts were taken in self-defense. Aggression, as such, has not been
raised in either advisory or contentious proceedings in the present Court
or its predecessor. Nevertheless, definition of the term has been the object
of lengthy effort, commencing with proposals from the Soviet Union in
1933. The issue has been addressed in the nonaggression treaties con-
cluded between the wars. Principles relating to aggression appear in the
Helsinki Accords, 27 in the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
on the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, 28 and in the Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression. 29
In establishing their United Nations, and drawing upon their experience
under the League of Nations, states realized that aggression was a matter
that needed both to be defined through future practice and to be limited
with respect to the relations among states. Article 2(4),30 limiting the use
of force or threats to use force, provided the Charter's norm to this end,
but it was balanced by the inherent right of states to use both self-defense
and collective self-defense as set forth in article 51.31
Article 24 of the Charter vests the Security Council with "the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." 32
Under article 25, the members of the United Nations "agree that in car-
rying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on
their behalf." 33 Article 39 vests the Security Council with decision-making
and the authority to make determinations with respect to "any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," 34 and that article
is given the fuller context of chapter VII. 35
In United Nations practice, the "primary responsibility" of the Security
Council over aggression has become the "exclusive responsibility" be-
cause the General Assembly has only recommendatory powers. The Res-
olution on the Definition of Aggression reflects both the limited powers
of the General Assembly and the exclusive powers of the Security Council.
27. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act (Aug. 1, 1975), reprinted
in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1292 (1975).
28. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
29. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 143-44, U.N. Doc. A/9890 (1974).
30. Statute of the Court, supra note 7, art. 36(2).
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
32. Id. art. 24.
33. Id. art. 25.
34. Id. art. 39.
35. Id. ch. VII.
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In adopting the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution36 the General Assembly
was compelled to state that that organ could only "consider the matter
(of aggression) with a view to making appropriate recommendations to
Members for collective measures." 37 But the Charter, as already noted,
declares under article 25 only that Members of the United Nations agree
to acceptand carry out the decisions of the Security Council. No such
provision in the Charter establishes comparable decisional authority in
the General Assembly.
Moreover, the overall context of the Charter is aimed at seeking effec-
tive control through the primary organs of the United States over the use
of force, and over aggression in particular. Such controls are akin to
executive actions of governments. The primary objectives of the Charter
include the establishment of security among states, drawing however upon
the usual processes among states in working out their differences. The
objectives and purposes of the Charter relate to the "maintenance of
international peace and security," and these objectives appear in the
preamble, and in the operative articles in chapter I, and throughout the
Charter. All of the organs have a role with respect to such matters. But
the effectiveness of control is maintained through the exclusive decisional
role limited to the Security Council.
Chapter VI concerning pacific settlement of disputes and Chapter VII
concerning aggression provide the major framework within which aggres-
sion is to be managed. 38 The Security Council has the far-reaching powers
already mentioned under article 39.
Objection may be raised that even though these be conceded as the
exclusive powers and authority in the Security Council, the Court can
and should isolate those issues that appear in the "legal dispute" and
"resolve" them. But here the difficulty is simply that of operating func-
tion: the Court cannot be expected and is not expected to take hold and
manage the actions and policies of states as such. It attempted to do so
in the Military Activities Case, but as Judge Schwebel has indicated, the
separating out of illegal uses of force where force is continuously traded
off in changing circumstances between the parties is meaningless in terms
of control.
Objection is frequently made that the Security Council has been im-
mobilized through the veto. But without the veto the United Nations
would never have been instituted. The veto reflects, both in operational
terms and symbolically, that the contentions between states with sharply
opposing and competing claims on the future of global order are not easily
36. G.A. Res. 377A, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20), U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. chs. VI, VII.
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solved. The problem can scarcely be formulated so that attempts to seek
a solution are largely reckless.
When the veto is exercised to prevent the Security Council from dealing
with specific claims of aggression, the practice of states since the Second
World War shows that other pressures continue to moderate the conflict
or confine it. The outbreaks of such violence reflect, then, the fundamental
and critical differences about global order among states, and compel the
states to recognize that they must move to shared expectations and com-
monalities about public order and provide it with the appropriate insti-
tutions, procedures, and processes to give it effectiveness in terms of
control and minimum security.
The realities of the functioning of the International Court of Justice
compel us to recognize, or ignore at our peril, the nature of the contention
for power among states in the global order, and to consider with care the
sharply differing values and attitudes of the Communist and other total-
itarian states and the democratic states. Three noted and distinguished
scholars have identified the present global processes as those of the "global
war system," where stress is shifted to military measures invoking force
or coercion in a wide array of violence. 39 There are the further realities
about the Court itself, about the constitution of the Court, and its com-
petence particularly when dealing with constitutive issues relating to the
structuring of power in the global order. It is notable, as mentioned earlier,
that only forty-six states are subject to its jurisdiction, many with res-
ervations, and that no Communist states have consented to its jurisdiction.
Analysis of justiciability might proceed deeply into United States Su-
preme Court practice to uncover a court's attitude toward political dis-
putes. The observations of Mr. Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr4° are
pertinent:
In the instance of nonjusticiability (as opposed to a court finding that it lacks
jurisdiction), consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately fore-
closed; rather, the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding
whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially
determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially
molded. 4
!
Mr. Justice Brennan, in the same case, provided further observations
relating to judicial management of the case, reflecting the political position
39. See generally McDougal, Reisman, & Willard, The World Process of Effective Power:
The Global War System, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW 353 (M. McDougal &
W. Reisman eds. 1985) (in the contemporary world community where the expectation persists
that differences may be resolved by violence or war, assessments of power are continuous
and significant factors in behavior).
40. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
41. Id. at 198.
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and role of the court itself as part of the political process. While this
position is tenuous enough within an established municipal system, the
following observations are even more pertinent, translated, of course, to
the international arena with respect to international tribunals and their
cases:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without express-
ing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
42
IV. Conclusion
The World Court, both under the League of Nations and the United
Nations, was established to attain strategic objectives that would be shared
within the global community. These objectives are aimed at maintaining
international peace and security and at promoting human rights. Such aims,
as state practice has shown, cannot be achieved by the singling out of on-
going relations and belligerency, legal disputes inherent in the military strat-
egies adopted among states. While the Court must engage in order-pro-
moting efforts, its function is derivative and secondary to other political
organs of the United Nations.
Without a firm commitment of states to the commonalities of global order,
a Court is compelled to exercise substantial restraint, or, as shown in the
Military Activities Case, it will quickly falter and lose its integrity. Even
assuming the highest competence and experience of its judges, commen-
surate with the challenge of establishing a global order from the current
competitive processes, we cannot place our confidence and expectations
in a court that addresses ongoing hostilities, even by severing elements of
legality from the more complex problems of state relations identified with
belligerency.
42. Id. at 217. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 224 (1972) concludes:
The contribution of the courts to foreign policy and their impact on foreign relations are
significant but not large. The Supreme Court in particular intervenes only infrequently
and its foreign affairs cases are few and haphazard. The Court does not build and refine
steadily case by case, it develops no expertise or experts; the Justices have no matured
or clear philosophies; the precedents are flimsy and often reflect the spirit of another day.
See also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1933) (full analysis of the
political question and justiciability).
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The relationships of states shift with the violence that erupts among them.
The facts developed by Judge Schwebel strongly indicate a shift to armed
conflict, where hostilities, even if intermittent, or of low intensity, are
governed by the law of war. But a variety of complex and changing issues
continually appear in the range of interstate relationships that extends from
belligerency to peaceful relations, and the use of force is never entirely
absent. Note, however, that the context in which violence or force is ex-
ercised, a subject entirely ignored by the Court, is that of the confrontation
between the free and totalitarian nations. Without an appraisal of this con-
text of public order, a Court, or any other decision-making entity, would
be unable to "resolve" disputes among the contending parties or monitor
adequate peace-keeping measures.
Judge Schwebel has characterized Nicaragua as the aggressor. A more
extended appraisal of the current situation in that country, weighing in the
massive military and support assistance provided, reveals Nicaragua as a
willing and cooperative instrument for Soviet and Cuban aggression aimed
at the United States and at other democratic states.
The World Court might have made a limited determination in the Military
Activities Case. It could have taken the position of the United States Su-
preme Court, acting as a prize court in the Paquette Habana,43 where,
exceptionally, the Supreme Court could discern a legal standard that could
effectively operate in the limited context of prize cases; or, the Court could
have drawn from Ex parte Milligan,44 in which the Supreme Court could
hold the executive organ to account, by requiring it to provide reasons for
its actions and for the "necessity" of acting as it did. But even in those
cases the matter could be realistically managed by the World Court only
in the far stronger organizational base established within a state like the
United States but not among them. It could be managed only against ex-
pectations strongly shared about how the Court might serve the goals of
the nation itself. 45
43. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
44. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
45. Shared expectations among states in the global community are notoriously tenuous.
For this reason, analogies between the World Court and the Supreme Court of the United
States, for example, must be proposed with extreme caution. The World Court seeks to
establish global order among competing states in a global war system. For United States
perspectives regarding the impact of the Military Activities Case upon regional and global
order, see the following publications of the Department of State: U.S. DE,'T OF STATE &
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, THE CHALLENGE To DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1986); the
72-Hour Document, a translation of the goals of the Sandinistas; and, Commandante Bay-
ardo Arce's Secret Speech Before the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN).
WINTER 1987

